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1  The general project
Conceptual spaces have been developed as a general framework for representing 
knowledge, including semantics. Already in Gärdenfors (2000, Ch. 5), a semantic 
analysis of nouns and adjectives was proposed. The theory of conceptual spaces 
has since then been extended to cover also actions (Gärdenfors 2007) and events 
(Gärdenfors and Warglien 2012). The main purpose of our article is to show how 
these models can form a basis for the semantics of verbs.
We are grateful to the commentators for their willingness to evaluate and 
critically discuss our proposal. The general project is positively received by the 
commentators. We find this encouraging for future work in the area. There are 
understandably also critical comments about the project. Some of them argue 
that we promise much more than we deliver. Some comments point out that our 
model is a tentative sketch that may not stand up to linguistic scrutiny. We agree 
that much of the analysis is presented too briefly in the article. We have focused 
on presenting the potential of the model in different areas of verb semantics 
 rather than developing the details. Further aspects of action and event represen-
tations have been presented by Gärdenfors (2007), Gärdenfors and Warglien 
(2012) as well as a general semantics framework in Warglien and Gärdenfors 
(2012). That said, we agree that there is still a lot to accomplish to flesh out the 
model into a viable theory of semantics.
Let us comment on the motivation for our paper. Our aim is to show that 
 concepts from cognitive science, in particular conceptual spaces, can be used to 
model lexical semantics, in particular the semantics of verbs. As such, it is an at-
tempt to establish a bridge between cognitive science and linguistics. Our empha-
sis is on presenting the general model and testing its viability. This entails that we 
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do not go into the details of the semantics of single words, as would be a common 
strategy for linguists. Of course, we know that this does not exempt the model 
from rigorous testing against linguistic data. In this way, the paper is a call for 
cooperation between linguists and cognitive scientists.
2  The event model
2.1  Comparison with Wolff’s model
In his studies of causal reasoning, Wolff has developed an account of events that 
he calls the dynamics model. Just as in our two-vector model, he focuses on the 
role of forces. What he calls position vector is what we call (motion) result vector. 
He takes his inspiration from Talmy’s (1988) force dynamics, where the situations 
investigated involve an interaction between the forces exerted by the Agonist 
(agent) and the Antagonist (patient) and the result of the interaction. Conse-
quently, in contrast to our model, Wolff always considers counterforces. The 
 models have been developed for slightly different purposes: ours is intended as a 
general model of events while Wolff focuses on causal reasoning. Wolff claims 
that the dynamics model offers a more detailed account of causation verbs. We 
agree, but see no conflict with our model. It should be noted that Talmy’s analy-
sis, just like Wolff’s model, only covers events involving causal concepts and as-
sociated with causation, enablement and prevention. Their models are thus less 
general than the two-vector model we propose.
Wolff writes that the two-vector model of verb semantics cannot fully capture 
the force dynamic representations in Talmy (1988). That is as it should be: Talmy’s 
examples concern the meaning of full sentences, not just single verbs. However, 
our model of events, which admits simultaneously patients and agent, forces, 
counterforces and results, can handle Talmy’s examples (even though we have 
not carried out the details of the analysis). The semantics of verbs is only related 
to the force or the result vector type, while the event model requires both, together 
with at least a patient space.
Wolff notes correctly that representations at the level of word meaning are 
much coarser than those at the level of non-linguistic cognition. He mentions 
evidence from perception studies and psychophysics that supports this posi-
tion.  Cognitive models involve more vectors and participants than the con-
struals used for generating linguistic expressions. Wolff concludes that people’s 
mental models are richer than what is implied by our two-vector model. We 
agree, but do not see this as a problem. The two-vector model is presented as 
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a minimal mental model of an event describing the lexical meaning of a verb, not 
the entire cognitive construal of an event. We allow further vectors and participants 
to be added to representations of events and the construals generated from them.
2.2 Paths and vectors
Some comments ask us to elaborate more on the relationship between vectors 
and paths. Krifka writes about different levels of complexity of paths (in physical 
space or in some property domain) and suggests that temporally situating vectors 
might considerably enrich the semantics of our model, in particular to cover cer-
tain phenomena related to movement events. The key implication of his com-
ments is that vectors do not carry enough information to capture the temporal 
aspects of events.
We don’t deny the role of time in characterizing many events, but instead 
 suggest that temporal aspects can be derived more economically from the order 
of  composition of vectors (a point already made by many philosophers, from 
Reichenbach onwards, and echoed indeed by Krifka himself in his comment as an 
alternative to explicit time indexing).
In the case of movement events, because a (directed) path through space can 
be represented by a chaining of displacement vectors, and vectors are chained 
by taking the head of the preceding vector as the tail of the following one, the 
ordered series of compositions (the “snapshots” of movement) provides a basic 
representation from which to derive temporal succession. Of course, the grain of 
event representations (the length of elementary displacement vectors) will deter-
mine the extent to which more or less subtle features of the path can be captured. 
Krifka points to the interesting example of paths with back and forth movement. 
While of course an explicit temporal indexing of vectors would provide a direct 
way to represent back and forth motion, other non-temporal representations can 
do the job. For example, one might capture “back and forth” motion in terms of 
whether (and how many times) vectors in a path cross the direction of the initial 
vector.1 Two crossings will capture one back and forth loop, four crossings will 
capture two such loops, etc. Similarly, you can count how many times you have 
been running in a circle without an explicit representation of time (see Kracht & 
Klein’s comments).
1 The approach is reminiscent of the use of “winding numbers” in topology (Poincaré), The 
original topological treatment of the winding number of a path relates only to closed paths and 
the associated vector fields (Henle 1979).
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Thus, while we do not deny the usefulness and intuitiveness of a temporal 
 notation, the “crossing vectors” approach provides a simple example of a way 
to  account for back and forth motion or circular motion without introducing 
time.
Krifka is right in that these complexities are important for some linguistic 
distinctions and that we do not explicitly consider the complexities. It should 
be recalled, however, that our model of events is cognitive, so a mental construal 
of an event may occur at different levels of granularity. When Mary walks in a 
crooked way from the train station to the city hall, she can be described as walk-
ing three kilometres in a course construal of the event where only the start and 
end point of the path are considered. On the other hand, at a finer level of con-
strual of the same event where the different segments of the path are repre-
sented as combined movement vectors, she can be said to have walked for six 
 kilometres.
Issues of the grain of event representations surface also in Krifka’s discussion 
of the crossing the park example. Why should the path in his 9a example be ac-
cepted as a crossing the park event (despite violating the topological constraint 
that the path should be within the boundaries of the park) while the example in 
9b should not?
The vector c crosses the direction d of the initial vector i.
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In order to deal with such a question, one should recall that in our semantic 
framework an expression like “crossing the park” represents a category of events. 
Whether a concrete example (like 9a or 9b) can be accepted as belonging to such 
a category will depend on the similarity to the prototype of the category. One 
might argue that when modest differences in the coarseness of the representation 
eliminate the violation of the topological constraints (as in 9a), the “amount” of 
the violation will be small and thus the example will be accepted as belonging to 
the crossing the park category, although with a modest degree of typicality. Thus, 
where Krifka sees a problematic relationship between reality and mental repre-
sentation, we see instead a classical issue of categorization.
Still reality may matter in determining what is an acceptable grain of repre-
sentation. For example, if a traveller’s path through China passes Hong Kong, it 
could generally be accepted as an example of a crossing of China, but if the travel-
ler has a single entry visa, visiting Hong Kong is considered as going out of China.
A similar point is made by Kracht & Klein, who also complain that our model 
of events is not fine-grained enough. They write that we reduce continuous 
change to summary change, which allows us to reduce the representation of an 
event to a pair of vectors. Again, we believe that by considering different levels of 
granularity in the event construals, our model can accommodate their points in a 
systematic manner. We agree that it remains to be done.
Kracht & Klein also argue that for some types of movement verbs, such as 
turning, a single vector is not sufficient to describe the change component of the 
event. This gives us an opportunity to clarify an ambiguity in our paper. We ex-
pect verbs to be modelled by a single type of vector, namely force or result, in a 
given domain. Of course many trajectories or paths cannot be reduced to a linear 
vector, but can be approximated by a sequence of result vectors of the same type. 
In the case of turning, the angular momentum can be derived (as a derivative) 
from the trajectory. Our use of the term result vector is a shorthand notation for 
result type of  vector, including both single vectors and path composition of same 
type of vector. We realize that our paper is not clear on this point. Thus just as the 
force vector should in general be seen as a force pattern, the result vector should 
in general be seen as a chaining of vectors.
Wolff suggests that our result vectors are of a different kind than force and 
position vectors. He asks what the length of a result vector implies. We connect a 
result vector to a particular domain, for example temperature or weight. The 
meaning of the length of a vector is dependent on the geometric structure of the 
domain. In the case of temperature, for example, the vector denotes the change of 
temperature. For example, boil (accomplishment) involves a vector that reaches 
the boiling temperature of a liquid. The length of the vector corresponds to the 
amount of change.
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More generally, it should be stressed that our vectors do not occur in a vacu-
um, but are always construed in relation to a domain, and thus inherit all the 
structural domain information. For example, since the domain of temperature 
is one-dimensional the heating vector has only one direction and two possible 
verses (up and down), while in the three-dimensional domain of colour, multiple 
directions are possible. In our opinion, the grounding of vectors in conceptual 
spaces is an advantage of our model. Many of the comments seem to ignore that 
behind the vector is a wealth of information coming from the domains that add 
semantic content.
A parallel problem of representation complexity arises with our use of “force 
vectors” and “pattern of forces” to characterize manner. At the heart of the use 
of  the concept of force is a simple idea. Using force vectors, we reframe the 
“naive” view that “within particular semantic domains there can be verbs that . . . 
describe carrying out activities – manners of doing” (Rappaport Hovav and Levin 
2010). A force vector is thus our elementary building block in the representation 
of “carrying out activities”.
Of course, in general, the characterization of an action requires more than a 
single force vector. It requires patterns of force vectors. For example, cycling in-
volves a (near circular) pattern of forces exerted with a 180° phase difference be-
tween the two feet. Just as single result vectors can be chained in paths, so single 
force vectors can be composed in patterns of forces. What characterizes manner 
is not a single force vector, but again a single type of vector, either in isolation or 
composed in a pattern.
More broadly, Geuder speculates that events have a conceptual architec-
ture  that is similar to that of object concepts. He suggests that an event can 
be described as a multi-domain construction in a way similar to the con-
struction  of  object categories. We find this idea extremely interesting and 
well worth developing. However, we will not attempt to present any such model 
here.
3  Comparison with Croft’s theory
Croft asks whether our theory is identical with his. There are indeed many simi-
larities. Both theories are based on vectorial representations of events that es-
chew logical or model-theoretic formalisms. However, there are also important 
differences between the theories. We will present here the differences a bit more 
explicitly than we do in the paper.
First we compare our analyses of events. Croft (2012, section 5.4.2) presents a 
“three-dimensional representation of causal and aspectual structure in events”. 
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What he calls dimension does not quite match our use of the term. The first two 
dimensions are the time dimension combined with a dimension of “qualitative 
state”. These two dimensions are used for his “phasal analysis of aspectual types” 
(Croft 2012, section 2.3.2). They are used to describe “subevents” that involve only 
one participant with its own aspectual contour (Croft 2012, p. 212). Croft treats all 
qualitative dimensions on a par and does not separate out the force domain as a 
special case. What he calls the dimension of qualitative state corresponds to what 
we call domains. In general we allow domains to be multi-dimensional and have 
a rich structure. As mentioned above, our vectors inherit a lot of information from 
the underlying domain structure. The q-dimensions in Croft’s model leave open 
such structure.
Croft’s third “dimension” is the causal chain linking the individual partici-
pant subevents. (Croft’s writes that this “dimension” is actually a graph struc-
ture.) This roughly corresponds to our mapping between the force vector and 
the  result vector. A difference is that Croft allows events to form causal chains 
 involving several subevents. This is illustrated by his analysis of “Sue broke 
the coconut for Greg with a hammer” (see the figure on p. 214 in Croft (2012)). 
Here Sue applying force is a subevent that causes the subevent of the hammer 
impacting the coconut that in turn causes the subevent of the coconut break-
ing,  which finally causes the subevent of Greg benefiting from the broken 
coconut.
This example brings out a fundamental difference in our analyses of what 
constitutes an event. For Croft, an event is a chain of causally linked sub-
events,  each consisting of a participant with an aspectual contour. For us, an 
event consists minimally of three necessary components: a force vector (that 
may be nil), a patient that the force vector acts on, and a result vector (may be 
a zero vector, that is, a point) that describes the change of the properties of the 
patient. To this minimal representation of an event, we can add further partici-
pants (agent, instrument, beneficiary . . .) and vectors (the force vector exerted 
by  the agent, goal vectors in intentional events . . .). Events can be chained by 
causal links, but we have no concept corresponding to “subevent”. Croft com-
plains that we do not represent force dynamic relations between participants. 
It  is true that we do not exploit them as extensively as he does in his subevent 
analysis. However, the model can include dynamic relations between agent 
and  patient and between agent, instrument and patient via the various force 
 vectors.
A second difference between the theories is the treatment of actions. Croft 
presents no analysis of what constitutes an action, nor of the role of actions in 
events. Even though it is only sketchily presented in section 2.3 of our paper, 
our account contains a vector-based model of actions. It is presented in further 
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detail in Gärdenfors (2007) and Gärdenfors and Warglien (2012). This model is 
central to our analysis of events since an action is represented by the force 
vector (or more generally pattern of force vectors) of an event. Furthermore, 
following the analysis of properties in Gärdenfors (2000), we define an action 
category as a convex set of force vectors (this is elaborated in Gärdenfors and 
Warglien 2012).
In his commentary, Croft asks what is the difference between a force vector 
and a result vector. Our answer is that in our model of events, force vectors are 
those acting on patients. (It should be noted that forces can be mental/social and 
not just physical.) In Croft’s model of subevents there is no difference in principle 
between qualitative dimensions involving forces and other dimensions. In con-
trast, our model contains a fundamental asymmetry. This is not a mathematical 
difference but a semantic difference in the “contents” of the force domain in con-
trast to other domains. One way to express this is that force vectors are used to 
represent causes, while result vectors represent effects.
A third difference is that Croft explicitly includes the time dimension in 
his  two-dimensional schemas. In contrast, our basic model does not require a 
time dimension. Time is implicit in the dynamics created by the force vector. We 
do not, however, exclude a time dimension as a semantic factor as Croft claims 
in  his commentary. On the contrary, we agree with Croft that for some verbs 
and adverbs, the time dimension is a necessary part of the semantic representa-
tion. We realize that we should have presented this point more clearly in the main 
 article.
Next, Croft asks how the mathematical properties of vectors contribute to 
an understanding of the structure of events. We will here give three examples 
of the benefits of vector representations. First, vectors can be more or less close 
to  one another. This corresponds to similarity of actions (via the closeness of 
the corresponding force vectors or force patterns) and similarity of results. We 
argue in section 4.2 that similarities of vectors provide a natural explanation for 
similarities of verb meanings. Second, vectors can be added and multiplied. The 
force vector acting on a patient can be added to a counterforce exerted by the 
patient. Wolff (2007, 2008) has shown that subjects’ judgements of causality are 
dependent on such additions of forces and counterforces. Furthermore, in many 
cases a force vector is balanced by a counterforce resulting in a state (for exam-
ple, prevent). We use multiplication of vectors in our analysis of the meaning of 
adverbs.
Third, sets of vectors can form convex sets. In particular, Gärdenfors and 
Warglien (2012) define an action category as a convex set of force vectors (force 
patterns). Since convexity has also been used in Gärdenfors (2000) to charac-
terize properties and object categories it is natural to propose that action catego-
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ries share a similar structure to object categories (Hemeren, 2008, p. 25). Indeed, 
there are strong reasons to believe that action categories exhibit many of the pro-
totype effects that Rosch (1975) presented for object categories. In support of this, 
Hemeren (2008) has shown that action categories show a similar hierarchical 
structure and have similar typicality effects to object concepts.
In section 4.2 of our paper, we claim that the similarity of vectors and the 
convexity of vectors sets representing verbs can explain similarities of verb mean-
ings, sub-categorizations of verbs and metaphorical uses of verbs. Admittedly, 
the arguments are presented in a sketchy manner and much work remains to spell 
it out in detail. Nevertheless, as far as we can see, these predictions do not follow 
from Croft’s (2012) model (although they are compatible with it).
To sum up, Croft’s theory and ours are presumably compatible, but there are 
substantial differences. In particular, Croft uses a “dimension” of qualitative state 
in his model. We enrich this by having a full conceptual space representation of 
action and result vectors, exploiting vector properties and convexity. This allows 
us, among other things, to explain similarities of verb meanings. On the other 
hand, Croft’s model generates a more fine-grained analysis of aspect than our 
does. For example, as he mentions in his commentary, his model can distinguish 
three types of states.
4  The single domain constraint
Our single domain constraint is a new proposal within verb semantics. If valid, 
it will have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, it is important to evaluate it. 
Several of the commentators discuss it, in particular Kracht & Klein who question 
its validity.
4.1  Manner/result complementarity
Let us begin our replies by discussing the manner/result complementarity among 
verbs. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1991, Rappaport 
Hovav and Levin 2010) formulate a strong version of the complementarity: the 
lexical meaning of any verb root is either manner or result. They derive this from 
their ACT-BECOME model of events together with the constraint that a verb root 
can only be associated with one primitive predicate in an event schema, as either 
an argument or a modifier. Since they assume that manner roots modify the pred-
icate ACT and result roots are arguments of BECOME, the manner/result comple-
mentarity follows (Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2010, Section 2). Our distinction 
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between force and result vectors maps quite clearly onto their ACT and BECOME, 
but adds a grounding in conceptual spaces.
Their version claims that the manner/result complementarity is inherent 
in  the lexical meaning of a verb root. This claim has been criticized (Goldberg 
2010, Koontz-Garbooden and Beavers 2012). In particular, there are verbs that 
seemingly can be used to express both manner and result, for example verbs of 
killing (Koontz-Garbooden and Beavers, 2012) such as drown, hang and crucify 
and verbs of cooking (Goldberg 2010) such as roast, fry and stew. In our paper we 
agree that some of these verbs have a double use. One could therefore formulate 
a weaker version of the constraint manner/result complementarity:
Weak version of manner/result complementarity: Each occurrence of a verb in 
an utterance is either manner or result.
In this version, the manner/result complementarity is not supposed to be 
part of the lexical meaning of the verb, but is determined from the meaning of 
the  utterance. However, we find this version far too weak. Therefore we pro-
pose to at least identify a basic manner or result use of a single verb, and pro-
pose  the following modified version of Rappaport Hovav and Levin’s (2010) 
 constraint:
Intermediary version of manner/result complementarity: Each verb root has a 
default manner or result type of meaning, but the other type can also become 
lexicalized.
This version of the complementarity still claims that a manner or result com-
ponent is the default meaning, but it allows that some verbs have a secondary 
meaning that can override the default in specific contexts.2 The intermediary ver-
sion is still compatible with the single domain constraint.
Two common mechanisms for meaning extension should be mentioned. 
The first is that a manner verb root such as fry is transformed in a metonymic 
way  to the strongly expected result that the food becomes fried. The result 
 meaning of the verb is then sometimes used unaccusatively: “The chicken fries.” 
The second mechanism is that a result verb such as drown is transformed into 
a manner verb with the meaning “cause to drown” by reprofiling the event. We 
realize that to make this story complete, we need to present a test for which mean-
ing of a verb is primary. Of course, which verbs have a second meaning lexical-
2 Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2010) make a distinction between what a verb lexicalizes and 
what can be inferred from a particular use of that verb in a context. According to them the 
criterion for lexicalized meaning is constancy of entailments across all uses. This still excludes 
that a verb is lexicalized as both manner and result. Our intermediary version preserves the 
idea that in any instance of use of a verb, it is either manner of result, but we do not exclude 
that both meanings are lexicalized.
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ized is dependent on the history of a particular language and it varies between 
languages.
On the explanatory side, we strongly subscribe to Kracht & Klein’s proposal 
that constraints on learnability explain both the general tendency of manner- 
result complementarity (or the single-domains constraint in general) and the ex-
ceptions to it. In particular, when the link between manner and result is reliable, 
there should be a strong tendency for either of the two mechanisms to apply, and 
for a verb to gain a secondary meaning.
Another explanatory consideration concerns verb modifiers as Geuder sug-
gests. In particular, force vectors have dimensions which are not shared by pa-
tient spaces representing result. The magnitude of force is peculiar to the force 
domain only and therefore adverbs expressing such magnitude, for example 
strongly, should apply to manners verbs (push strongly, hit strongly), but not to 
result verbs (#move strongly, #fall strongly, #break strongly). This principle ap-
plies as well for manner verbs that are represented by a single force vector, for 
example contact verbs. In the situation of manner verbs that are represented by 
patterns of forces, however, the situation is less transparent. While force magni-
tude is peculiar to manner, direction clearly is not. So modifiers expressing direc-
tion are generally shared by force and result vectors, for example ahead and left 
(push ahead, move ahead).
In his commentary, Geuder complains that our force-result distinction does 
not correspond to the manner-result distinction that has been used in linguistics. 
He uses Rappaport Hovav and Levin’s (2010) scalarity test to make the distinction 
and he claims that our division between force and result vectors does not corre-
spond to the results of this test. In our paper, we give arguments for not accepting 
the scalarity test (it has been proven problematic by, among others, Goldberg 
2010). For example pull, which is a manner verb, can exhibit scalar changes. 
Hence, we do not find Geuder’s arguments against the force-result distinction 
valid. He also claims that durativity, which is part of the meaning of many man-
ner verbs, cannot be modelled by forces. It is true that we do not present such a 
model, but we see no problem in adding a durativity component to the force vec-
tor of an event.
Krifka takes up our analysis of climb in his commentary. He agrees with our 
and Geuder and Weisgerber’s (2008) diagnosis of the verb as determined by a 
force with an upward direction where the upward movement often is expected, 
but optional. We find his evidence that the compatibility of climb with down-
ward  movement is a relatively recent phenomenon very interesting. What is 
changing historically, in our opinion, is not the default meaning of climb as a 
force vector, but the result expectations associated with it. As regards the dif-
ference between German klettern and steigen, the primary meaning of steigen 
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may be a result vector (cf. rise in English) as in “Der Ballong steigt” (“The balloon 
is rising”) and “Die Temperatur steigt” (“The temperature is rising”). This calls 
for further investigation.
4.2 Posture verbs
Krifka discusses posture verbs such as sit, stand and lie that are unusual stative 
verbs in that that they allow progressive aspect in English. (Incidentally, they ex-
press transitory states in Croft’s (2012) terminology). His proposal is that verbs 
such as sitting and lying imply not only that the agent exerts a force on the object 
sat on or lain on, but also that the object exerts a balancing counterforce on the 
agent. The stative situation thus involves a dynamic balance. The analysis is ele-
gant and it is an interesting application of our framework.
Krifka also notices that there is a difference in the meaning of the verbs be-
tween the following two cases:
a. Mary is lying on the bed.
b. The blanket is lying on the bed.
He suggests, correctly in our opinion, that the difference lies in (no pun intended) 
that Mary can control her state, while the blanket cannot. Krifka writes that the 
posture verbs can assign two types of roles to their subject – either as an agent 
or  as patient. We almost agree. In our terminology, Mary is both agent and 
 patient in (a), while the blanket is only patient in (b). The difference shows up as 
follows:
c. Mary laid the blanket down on the bed. (Mary agent, blanket patient)
d. Mary laid (herself) down on the bed. (Mary agent and patient)3
e. #The blanket laid (itself) down on the bed. (The blanket cannot be agent)
In the case of an animate agent/patient, lying, sitting, standing and other posture 
verbs involve an intentional component, that is, the agent is taking its posture on 
purpose. Krifka writes that the agent has control over situation. We see this as a 
special case of intentionality being part of many verb meanings.
3 In German and several other languages the reflexive is compulsory: “Mary legte sich auf das 
Bett”.
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Krifka suggests that a verb like lie is ambiguous between assigning an “ac-
tive” force vector to the subject, that would be the result of her being a volitional 
agent, and assigning a “passive” vector to the subject, that is the result of gravity. 
Our model, however, does not distinguish different types of vectors (i.e., active vs. 
passive). Rather, to accommodate the intentional aspect of stative verbs with an 
animate subject, our basic model is extended by a goal space as described in Sec-
tion 3.2. We would treat stative verbs that behave like lie as being semantically 
underspecified, having an optional goal space.
4.3  Causal verbs and verbs involving two events
In their commentary, Kracht & Klein present two types of examples that they 
claim will violate the single-domain constraint. The first is verbs of (mental) coer-
cion ( persuade, force, compel). Kracht and Klein claim that these verbs lexicalize 
both a manner and a result component. We partly agree, but we do not see these 
examples as counter-examples to the single domain constraint. The reason is that 
constructions with these verbs involve another verb. The form is “X persuades/
forces/compels Y to V”, where V is a verb. The coercion verb is a manner verb in 
an event generated by an agent X acting on a patient Y that combines with an-
other verb describing another event where Y is agent.4 The second event can be 
seen as a result of the coercion event, but this does not mean that the coercion 
verb lexicalizes a result component. This is the job of the second verb V. As a mat-
ter of fact, V can be almost any verb – manner or result. What makes the coercion 
verbs special is that the result of the force vector is not a result vector of the type 
we consider in our article, but rather a new event. In brief, coercion verbs have a 
more complicated meaning structure than the verbs we consider, but they do not 
invalidate the singe domain constraint.
The second class of verbs considered by Kracht & Klein are verbs involving 
establishment of conventional fact: buy, inherit, etc. They argue that the differ-
ence between buy and inherit is part of a manner component, while the verbs also 
involve the result component that a change of ownership takes place. We agree to 
this, but do not see it as a counterexample to the single domain case, since we 
propose that again two event construals are involved: the intended result and the 
manner of achieving the result.
In section 4.6 of our paper, we give a brief description of some such inten-
tional verbs. Kracht & Klein acknowledge this, but they are not convinced by our 
4 This is clear from the lexicon definition cited by Kracht & Klein.
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arguments. They doubt that the intention of buying something is part of the lexi-
cal meaning of buy. It is true that in the modern world one can unintentionally 
buy something by clicking on a button or by waving one’s hand at the wrong 
 moment during an auction. Nevertheless, these unintentional actions are 
 consequences of conventional routines for settling a transaction. In our opinion, 
the original meaning of buy involves an intention on the part of the agent, but the 
meaning of buy has later been extended to cover also “happen to buy”.
In line with Kracht & Klein’s first class of verbs, Wolff argues that verbs of 
causation – for example cause, allow, enable, block – cannot be single domain 
since they involve both force and result. However, his examples involve interac-
tions between two force vectors (from the Agonist and the Antagonist), a case 
which is not covered by our model, but it does not really leave the single domain 
of forces.5 These cases always require either another verb – “X prevents Y from 
infracting the law” – or a nominalization of a verb – “X allows an infraction of the 
law by Y”. Again, the causation verbs involve more complicated situations than 
our basic model.
Furthermore, Wolff suggests that in order to express causation verbs one 
needs to specify the “tendency” of the Antagonist, which requires endpoints – 
once more a positional notation outside the force domain. However, the counter-
force of the antagonist already points in such direction, which makes it sufficient 
to express the manner component of causal events.
Wolff objects that force vectors are not sufficient to distinguish between man-
ner verbs like push and pull, because they imply a position vector for the agent. 
However, it should be recalled that vectors are associated with a domain space in 
which things can be located: a push or pull force vector is applied on a point in a 
domain space (typically, but not necessarily the physical space). It verse splits the 
space in two halves, one behind and the other in front of this point. The force 
expresses pull if the agent is located in the in-front half and push if it is located in 
the behind half. Once more, one should should not forget the rich information 
conveyed by the space in which vectors are construed.
5  Conclusion: May the force be with you!
The separation of forces from results is one of the central themes of our model. It 
is similar to Wolff’s idea, but he only considers a class of verbs related to causa-
5 In our paper we suggest that adding counterforces is an extension of our prototypical model 
that does not violate its principal structure.
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tion. Croft’s theory is also similar to ours and as general, but he does not bring out 
the force domain as having a special status.
While many comments have been focusing on the separation of forces from 
results, our model should draw attention to the problem of how they interact and 
of their grounding in spatial concepts, that is, the structure of different domains. 
What we need is a better understanding of the mapping from force vector to result 
vector. This is a core problem for understanding causal thinking, but it will also 
help us better understand the semantics of verbs.
The single domain constraint for verbs has been under heavy fire. We have 
tried to defend it, but to determine its validity much more detailed work is re-
quired. However, we still think the single domain constraint is valuable because 
it could become, perhaps in a more precise formulation, a central part of an ex-
planation why children can learn language so efficiently (cf. Bloom 2000). It also 
reminds us that forces and results are rooted in the underlying domain structure 
that contains key semantic information.
We are grateful to the commentators who have directed us to areas where 
we need to develop the model further. As we have tried to explain in these replies, 
we believe that this can still be done within the general framework of our event 
model.
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